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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the challenges on the privacy 
of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems. 
RFID systems have already widely applied in industry 
and have been bringing lots of benefits to our daily life, 
it also creates new security and privacy problems to 
individuals and organizations. The security and privacy 
challenges are analysed after a brief introduction of 
various RFID systems and their associated operations. 
A proposal to protecting security and privacy of 
customers, as a solution of the challenge for low-cost 
RFID systems is designed. Finally, comparisons to 
related works of the proposal are described.  
 
Keywords: RFID, Privacy, Security. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an 
automatic identification method to identify objects and 
human beings without physical contact. The 
identification method relies on storing and remotely 
retrieving data using devices called RFID tags or 
transponders. A tag is a small microchip which is used 
for wireless data transmission between the tag and a 
reader. The microchip can be as small as 0.4mm2 [12]. 
RFID tags can be attached to or incorporated into a 
product, animal, or person for the purpose of 
identification using radio waves. RFID systems 
normally consist of tags, readers and database systems 
to process the data from tags as shown in Figure 1. 
RFID has been widely applied in a lot of 
environments such as hospital [2], road toll, access 
control to facilities, and e-passport [6]. The major driver 
for the increasing application of RFID is the falling 
price of RFID tags which is going to be less than 5 cents 
[10]. According the low-cost tags and various 
application of RFID in our current life, we have started 
to concern the security and privacy surrounding RFID 
systems. Customers identity can be obtained and used 
by wicked readers since currently RFID systems do not 
provide protection on the identification, and 
unauthorized readers are able to collect customer 
identity and goods to generate customer profiles which 
will reveal private information [15]. For instance, 
customers carry retail items with tags of insecure RFID 
systems. An adversary may query the tags for contents 
since tags lack secure access. This might look as 
innocuous inspections, but nobody like people glancing 
their shopping items or peeking into their bags. Insure 
RFID system threats are not only limited to individual 
security and privacy violations, but also to companies 
and shops. A shop, for example, installs a smart system 
and stocks products with insure RFID tags. The RFID 
system can be attacked in various ways. A competitor of 
the shop may automatically query the shop’s inventory, 
and derives sales information for making a business 
decision as a corporate spy. The competitor can also re-
write the contents of cheap products to expensive items 
which will confuse the selling report of the shop. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, 
we describe the security and privacy issues in an RFID 
system, and followed by the mechanisms on security 
and privacy of low-cost RFID systems in section 3, 
including killing and sleeping tags approaches and hash-
based access control on tags. A new protocol for low-
cost RFID systems is designed in section 4. To achieve 
low computation and energy cost, n random numbers 
are used in the protocol. The protocol is securely 
designed for a large number of tags RFID system, and 
can prevent long-range eavesdropper attack. 
Comparisons to other related work are analyzed in 
section 5 and the conclusions are in section 6. 
 
2. Security and privacy 
 
A reader needs to communicate with tags and an 
application system which processes the data from the 
reader. Generally we do not concern too much about the 
security between the reader and application system since 
we can use current secure techniques, rather than the  
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security challenges and technologies between the reader 
and tags. Privacy is also a serious concern for customers, 
and it may be an obstacle for RFID application when 
customers privacy is not able to   guarantee. People may 
carry objects with communicating readers without even 
realizing the existence of tags. Passive tags usually send 
data out without security authentication when they 
receive a signal from readers. The data may also link to 
other secret information and location message that 
should be protected. Fundamental security objectives as 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and anonymity 
are not achieved in RFID systems without the supports 
from special security mechanisms [16, 1]. For example, 
Confidentiality is defined as ensuring that information is 
accessible only to those authorized to have access. The 
communication between a reader and tags in RFID 
systems is not protected by secure mechanisms. 
Eavesdroppers may then obtain information during their 
communication. The data risk from a reader to tags 
means forward channel is higher than that from tags to 
the reader means backward channel since the different 
power ranges. The work power range in forward 
channel can be hundreds meters, but the range in 
backward channel usually is several mini meters. Tags 
memory can also read if there is no access limits [16]. 
      Proposals for RFID security and privacy are 
categorised in two groups: one is  for low-cost tags that 
cannot perform any computations, and the other is for 
higher capability tags (active tags) which are able to do  
some limited cryptographic operations [1]. We focus on 
the security and privacy of low-cost RFID systems in 
this paper.   
The main challenge of low-cost RFID tags is that 
they are not able to process any kind of access control 
mechanisms on the data stored. This feature of the low- 
cost RFID tags provides a query response of any reader 
without authentication, and hence clandestine scanning 
of the tags is a possible threat. On the other hand, low- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cost tags are normally deployed in a wide area. As a 
result of the deployment, private information may 
disclose through the tags they carry. For instance, tags 
on medicines may show what diseases a person has, and 
books include what are your interests. More ever, 
people never want to let others know the number and 
how much they have in their wallet, especially when 
walking alone in a street. 
 
3. Security mechanisms 
 
This section presents the existing mechanisms for 
security and privacy which include killing and sleeping 
tags in RFID systems and hash function engaged access 
methods.  
 
Killing and sleeping 
Customers security and privacy are protected if there 
is no response of tags carried by customers. The Kill 
idea of tags comes from this real truth [5]. For example, 
A RFID reader at a POS terminal can send a kill order 
to a RFID tag within the product customers bought, the 
kill order will change the tags state to be disable. To 
protect tags killed by unauthorized readers, such a 
command is authenticated by passwords. 
Killing tags is an efficient solution to the security and 
privacy challenges: neither sensitive information nor 
private information tracking is possible. While killing 
approaches bring us a desirable solution, it also loses all 
the post-purchase benefits from RFID, for instance, 
returning a tag without any history. Furthermore, tags 
cannot be killed in some applications. A good example 
is the books in a library borrowed out which have to 
receive the information of tags again attached in the 
books during returning books. A solution to avoid 
losing the benefits is not killing tags but temporarily 
putting in disable state. Readers send a sleep command 
to tags rather than a Kill when tags are checked out. 
Tags cannot response during sleeping state including  
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stealthily read, but sleeping tags can come back if 
needed. Of course, all commands like kill, sleep, and 
wake up should be authenticated, for example using   
PIN. A question here is how to manage the 
authentication making an RFID system more efficient. It 
looks that customers can not remember too many PIN 
numbers which is an unrealistic requirement since we 
already have many accounts, and will have more tags in 
very soon future. 
 
Hash-based access control 
A simple secure scheme adopting one-way hash 
function is described in [16]. The tags in the scheme is 
hash-enabled with a portion of memory reserved for a 
temporary metaID and two locked or unlocked state. To 
lock a tag, a tag owner sends a hashed number to the tag 
as its metaID: metaID  hash(key). This may occur either 
over the Radio Frequency channel or a physical contact 
channel. The owner stores both the key and metaID in a 
back-end database. The tags state is locked when a 
metaID is received, and its response to all queries is the 
metaID without other functionality.  To unlock a tag, the 
owner has a searching of the appropriate key in the 
back-end database when he gets the metaID and delivers 
the key to the tag. The tag compares the value of hashed 
key to the stored metaID. It unlocks itself when the 
values match, and offers additional functionality to 
readers.  This protocol is shown in Figure 2. 
The proposed protocol is able to prevent 
unauthorised readers from receiving tag message due to 
the inverting difficulty of the hash function. Spoofing on 
the scheme is detected. An adversary can send a query 
for the metaID, and then spoof the tag to a authorised 
reader in a replay attack. The reader will send the key to 
the spoofed tag, but the reader may check the contents 
of the tag against the back-end application system to 
verify the responded contents and proper metaID. The 
adversary is detected since its response of the contents 
is failed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This scheme requires implementing a hash function 
on the tag and managing keys on the application system. 
It may be economical in the near future since the 
computation and anergy cost is quite low. It is unknown  
if or not the hash function can be implemented with less 
resource than symmetric encryption algorithms. It may 
be not quite difference in the context of low-cost RFID 
tags. The minimal hardware complexity of a hash 
function remains a real open problem [8]. Unfortunately, 
tracking of individuals in the scheme is still existed 
since the metaID is a part of identifier, and the scheme 
is not suitable for large number of tags since the hash 
function operation in tags and the back-end system.  
 
4. A randomized access protocol 
 
In the hash-based access control scheme, a tag must not 
respond predictably to queries of unauthorized readers, 
but be identifiable by legitimate one. Additional 
operations are required to prevent the individual 
tracking. We present a new randomized access scheme 
to improve the hash-based scheme. The new scheme 
does not need a hash function to avoid the current RFID 
applications and individual tracing as well, furthermore, 
the new scheme can be applied for large number of tags. 
The basic ideas of the new scheme are to install a few 
random numbers to a tag when an RFID system is set up. 
Tags respond to reader queries by combining its ID and 
a random number r, and sending ID  r to a reader 
where r is randomly chosen from the stored random 
number. A legitimate reader identifies the tag by 
searching its ID database and the random numbers in 
the back-end application system until a match is found. 
The protocol is illustrated in Figure 3 and details are in 
protocol 1. The random number in the scheme makes 
the difficulty of inverting the real ID from ID  r even 
though it is revealed to an adversary. The tag’s response 
is random and meaningless to anyone without the 
random number. 
  
4 
The protocol 1 
Initinization:  
The application system creates a unique identity for 
each tag and n random numbers r1, r2, ..., rn. Each tag 
has its own identity and the n random numbers.  
 
Procedures of identification:  
1. Reader R sends queries to Tag; 
 
2. Tag randomly selects a random number  
ri (i = 1, 2, ..., n), and computes ID  ri; 
 
3. Tag sends ID  ri to R; 
 
4. R does a searching in the back-end system for a 
match; and transmits  ; 
 
5. T unlocks itself if it receives  . 
 
       The proposed scheme does not have a hash function, 
but it still needs a lot of work on the searching of a large 
number tags in the back-end system. We present a 
classification of tags with proper prefix which will fast 
the searching. As we mentioned before, the forward 
channel from reader-to-tag is strong and easy attacked 
by unauthorized users who may derive the tag 
information. Assume all tags are classified with 
associate prefix, it means some tags share common ID 
prefix, such as a factory location or product code and 
class. The scheme does not broadcast insecure tag IDs 
on the forward channel, instead of, a reader broadcast a 
query including a certain prefix which means tags with 
the prefix only respond the query. The response is 
 as we described before, and the prefix is 
excluded. 
      A long-range adversary can obtain the message 
through the forward channel but not the tag response in 
the backward channel which is only effect a short 
distance such as mm or even shorter. Tags in the RFID 
system are classified with prefix, legitimate readers can 
obtain the response of tags with the prefix. On the other 
hand, proper prefix may also be used to conceal the 
value of the portion of tags IDs. Assume two tags with 
ID values   A reader will receive b1 from 
both tags without a collision, then detects on the next bit. 
The value b1 is secret from long range eavesdroppers, 
the reader may send  to simulate the desired tag 
without revealing any bit. 
      The extended scheme effectively protect against 
long range eavesdropper of the froward channel with 
little extra computation. Eavesdroppers within the range 
of  the backward channel will obtain the response of  
 , but as we explain earlier, it is  either useless 
since a random number is included inside. 
 
5. Comparisons 
 
      The closed work to this paper are modest proposal 
for low-cost RFID systems for security and privacy [9] 
and YA-TRAP: a trivial RFID authentication protocol 
[14].  
     Ranasinghe et.al [9] proposed security mechanisms 
for low-cost RFID systems where re-encryption process 
based on public key encryption or private key 
encryption was used for a label authentication. The 
authors have also discussed both the framework of 
RFID systems and challenges in manufacturer and 
distributors, and the label was contributed to the 
security and privacy features. Their work is different 
from ours in several aspects. First, it focuses on 
challenges in manufacturer and distributors supporting 
the framework with labels of different tag classes. By 
contrast, our work has analysed the security and privacy 
issues in both passive and active tags RFID systems, 
and the computation and energy differences in these two 
tags systems.  Second, the security mechanism proposed 
in their paper needs public key encryption or private key 
encryption in re-encryption process for label 
authentications. This is a high requirement for low-cost 
RFID systems since they have around 2000 gates 
computation for security. By contrast, we do not have 
this critical requirement in this paper. Instead of, a few 
random numbers r1, r2, ..., rn are used in the new 
protocol for security and privacy which are more 
practical and significant for low-cost RFID systems. 
Third, they have not discussed if or not their proposal is 
suitable for a RFID system with large number tags, but 
the new protocol in this paper adopts the binary prefix 
supporting large number tags in RFID systems.  
       Tsudik [14] proposed a trivial RFID authentication 
protocol. The protocol involves minimal interaction 
between a tag and readers. Additionally, a single keyed 
hash function and pseudo-random function are 
performed in a tag. While Tsidik claimed that the hash 
function and pseudo-random function are simple 
techniques for inexpensive untraceable RFID tags, it is 
doubted whether these two functions work well for low-
cost RFID systems. The major differences between their 
work and the work in this paper are in two aspects. First, 
each tag is equipped with a sufficiently strong, uniquely 
seeded pseudo-random number generator, and a keyed 
hash function. This assumption is reasonable for RFID 
systems with active tags with high costs or for future 
low-cost RFID system, but it may negatively effect the 
current low-cost RFID applications with the hash 
function engaged protocol since increasing 1000 gate 
counts in a tag will cost more 1 cent under current tag 
technology. By contrast, there is no hash function in our 
work nor a random generator function. Additionally, the 
designed protocol in this paper is able to apply for large 
number tags RFID systems, but the trivial RFID  
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authentication protocol did not analyse this scalable 
property for RFID systems.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have discussed the security and privacy of RFID 
in this paper. RFID systems have been widely applied 
for a large number of applications associated to object 
identification. In the mean time, customers are  
beginning to worry about their security and privacy in 
the systems. This could be a big obstacle for a 
commercial application of RFID system, a number of 
security and privacy questions are still open due to the 
cost of tags. Although we still on the way to implement 
a 5-cent tag, a number of proposals exist even strict 
conditions, and most of them need hash functions which 
can only be used either future or a high cost. A protocol 
has been developed in this paper for low-cost RFID 
systems. The system is able to apply for a RFID system 
with a large number of tags and prevent long-range 
eavesdropper attacks, the individual tracking, and Tags  
in the system must not respond predictably to queries of 
unauthorized readers, but be identifiable by legitimate 
one. Binary operation only required in tags without hash  
function, the computation and energy cost of tags is very 
low and it is suitable for current applications such as 
privacy-enhancing identity management systems and 
commercial transactions without human intervention. 
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